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Comments
LEGAL CLAIMS TO NEWLY EMERGED ISLANDS
If a new island arose from the sea, as is likely to occur
between the Volcano and Mariana Islands, to which State
would it appertain? This Comment examines four theories of
international law through which States might attempt to
claim new islands. One theory derives from the 1958 Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea. The others are the cus-
tomary international law doctrines of contiguity, occupation
and discovery. After determining that in this location only
occupation and discovery would be applicable, the Comment
concludes with an analysis of whether a claim would be polit-
ically feasible.
There was a tremendous explosion as the liquid rock struck water and
air together. Clouds of steam rose miles into the air. Ash fell hissing
upon the heaving waves. Detonations shattered the air for a moment
and then echoed away in the immensity of the empty wastes.
But rock had at last been deposited above the surface of the sea. An
island-visible were there but eyes to see, tangible were there fingers
to feel-had risen from the deep.'
In March, 1974, a Japanese fishing vessel was sailing approximate-
ly 150 miles northwest of the Mariana Islands when it encountered a
previously unknown area of water no more than ten feet deep.2 The
fishermen reported their discovery to the Japanese Maritime Safety
Agency, which radioed warnings of the shallow spot. The Agency
also requested reports of any other spots discovered. In late 1975 the
United States obliged, having found an area only 177 feet deep some
nineteen miles from the previous discovery. The United States also
reported other shallows nearby.3
The discoveries took place roughly half way between the islands of
Farallon de Pajaros and Minami-io Jima, which are approximately
1. J. MCHENER, HAWAII 5 (1959).
2. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
3. Id.
300 miles apart. Pajaros, a United States Trust Territory, is the
northernmost of the Marianas Group. Minami-io Jima, a part of
Japan, is the southernmost of the Volcano Islands. These islands and
the groups to which they belong are links in a chain of volcanoes
stretching from Mount Fuji in Japan to Guam. They form part of the
"Ring of Fire" that encircles the Pacific Ocean.
Subsequent patrols dispatched by the United States and Japan
have failed to locate the two earlier discoveries. However, the patrols
have discovered other areas of relatively shallow water. Some vol-
canic peaks extend to within 1,000 feet of the surface. This depth may
appear considerable, but in comparison with the surrounding water
it is slight. The islands of the Fuji-Marianas volcanic zone are the
peaks of volcanoes which rise abruptly from deep underwater ridges.
These ridges, in turn, tower above very deep seabed. Waters of the
nearby Izu and Marianas Trenches are among the deepest on earth.
4
It is likely that new islands will soon emerge from the sea in the
area between the Volcano and Mariana Islands.5 The ownership of
new islands would present various problems in the law of the sea.
Because an island arising in this area would be beyond the internal
waters of any State, its ownership would be uncertain, though of
great importance. An island might have its own territorial sea, conti-
nental shelf and fishing zone as provided in the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tions on the Law of the Sea.6 Rights over an island's continental shelf
could be particularly important because the shelf might contain
valuable mineral resources.
4. The Volcano and Mariana Islands form a chain running roughly from
north to south. To the east of the chain are the Izu and Marianas Trenches. At
the southern end of the Marianas Trench is the deepest spot on earth, with a
depth of 36,198 feet below sea level. To the west of the chain is an abyssal plain,
with a maximum depth of 15,400 feet. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, NA-
TIONAL GEOGRAPHIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD 178, 180 (4th ed. 1975).
5. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § 1, at 6, col. 1. The emergence of new islands is
uncommon but not unknown. In 1928 a new island emerged within the Kingdom
of Tonga. Hoffmeister & Ladd, Falcon, The Pacific's Newest Island, 54 NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC 757 (1928). A volcano increased the size of Fayal Island (Azores
group) in 1958 when it merged with the island after rising separately. Scofield, A
New Volcano Bursts from the Atlantic, 113 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 735 (1958). As
recently as 1965 the island of Surtsey emerged off the southern coast of Iceland.
Thorarinsson, Surtsey: Island Born of Fire, 127 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 713 (1965).
6. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29,
1958, 17 U.S.T. 139, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the High
Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
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Fishing rights in the area between the Volcano and Mariana Is-
lands would constitute the immediate concern. Koreans, Taiwanese
and Japanese fish these waters. Should the United States, for exam-
ple, acquire sovereignty over an island, it could enforce its recently
enacted 200-mile economic zone, thus regulating fishing.'
Ultimately the consequences of claims to new islands could extend
far beyond the United States and Japan to the continuing Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). 8 A
principal goal of UNCLOS I is to negotiate a treaty creating an
international regime governing seabed exploitation. A successful
claim would reduce the area such a regime would control.
A claim could also cause interpretation of requirements for an
island to generate a continental shelf or an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ). The Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), a draft
treaty being used in contemporary UNCLOS I negotiations, defines
an island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide."9 Under the ICNT only an island
capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own
can generate a continental shelf or an EEZ. 10 Although above water
at high tide, numerous islets and rocks in the sea are considered too
barren to generate continental shelves or EEZs. A liberal interpreta-
tion of what is required for an island to be capable of sustaining
human habitation or economic life of its own could lead States to
claim continental shelves and EEZs for islets and rocks previously
considered incapable of generating them.
This Comment explores four theories of international law through
which claim to newly emerged islands could be made." The four
7. See United States Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (West Supp. 1977).
8. For a brief account of UNCLOS III negotiations, see generally Synopsis,
Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1976-1977, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
718, 719-24 (1977); Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 628, 629-32 (1976); Recent Developments in the Law of the
Sea: A Synopsis, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 665, 666-68 (1975). See also Afterword,
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Report on the 1976
New York Sessions, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 736 (1977).
9. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/W?. 10, art. 121(1) (1977).
10. Id., art. 121(3).
11. These four are not intended to be an exhaustive catalogue of such
theories. For example, the sector theory, which is similar to the doctrine of
contiguity, is not discussed because it only applies to polar areas. See Waldock,
Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, [1948] 25 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 311 (1962).
theories are divided into two classes which approach the problem
from different perspectives. The first class predicates claim to a new
island on an existing claim to the seabed from which it arose. The
1958 Geneva Conventions and the customary international law doc-
trine of contiguity are the two theories comprising this class. The
second class of theories assumes that a new island would be a res
nullius, or territory owned by no one. A res nullius may be claimed
through occupation or discovery, the third and fourth theories. Occu-
pation may be defined as exercising control over a territory, while
discovery entails finding and then ceremonially annexing territory. 2
These theories do not confer the same rights on a successful claim-
ant. In the present context, the word "claim" means no more than an
amorphous right. Discussion of each theory identifies the specific
rights bestowed and evaluates application of the theory to an island
arising between the Volcano and Mariana Islands.
Finally, the probability of success of a legal claim to new islands is
viewed in the highly political context of UNCLOS I. Since the 1958
Geneva Conventions were signed, many underdeveloped States have
been clamoring for a share of the sea's riches as the earth's mineral
and food supplies diminish. The Comment concludes with a discus-
sion of whether a legal claim to new islands would be feasible in the
current political climate.
12. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59
Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, codifies generally accepted sources of international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular... ;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d .... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qual-
ified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law.
The 1958 Geneva Conventions are treaties and thus within § a. The other
three theories-contiguity, occupation, and discovery-are rules of customary
international law. The requirements of a rule of customary international law are
commonly seen to include:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a
type of situation falling within the domain of international relations;(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable
period of time;(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with,
prevailing international law; and(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.
Working Paper on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commis-
sion, [195012 Y.B. INT'L L. ComM'N 24,26, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1950/Add. 1.
All the sources of international law listed by the International Court of Justice
Statute are consulted in examining these theories of claim.
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CLAIMS BASED ON EXISTING SEABED CLAIMS
Conventional Law
The first theory of claim is a prior sea or seabed claim through
conventional law. The basis for this claim differs, depending upon
whether an island arose in a State's territorial sea, on its continental
shelf, or from the neighboring deep sea floor.'3 A State's rights over
these zones are governed by the 1958 Geneva Conventions, 4 which in
part codify customary international law and in part delineate
compromises reached at the first Law of the Sea Conference. 5
Territorial Sea
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Territorial Sea Convention states that
"It]he sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its
internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the
territorial sea. ' '16 Article 2 states that sovereignty also extends to the
seabed, subsoil and superjacent airspace within the territorial sea.17
Although Jessup considers the littoral State to exercise sovereignty
over the territorial sea, this conception is technically a simplifica-
tion.'8 Paragraph 2 of Article 1 modifies the State's sovereignty by
providing that its exercise is subject to the rest of the Convention
"and to other rules of international law."' 9
The insertion of Article 1, paragraph 2, reflects a historical debate
whether the State exercises sovereignty (an absolute right) or merely
jurisdiction (a collection of lesser rights) over the territorial sea.2 0 For
purposes of claiming an island arising in the territorial sea, the
13. The boundaries among these three zones are flexible. The Territorial Sea
Convention does not state the width of a territorial sea. The Continental Shelf
Convention is bounded only by the greater of the limits of seabed exploitability
or 200 meters of depth. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva,
Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
14. Because the Marianas are a Trust Territory, it is not certain that the 1958
Geneva Conventions would apply. See Nordquist & Moore, Emerging Law of
the Sea: Issues in the Mariana Islands, 7 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 43, 57 (1972).
15. See B. BUZAN, SEABED PoLITIcS 37-52 (1976).
16. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1(1), 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,516 U.N.T.S. 205.
17. Id., art. 2.
18. Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 234, 241-42 (1959).
19. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29,1958, art. 1(2), 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,516 U.N.T.S. 205.
20. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 533-42 (1965). See 4 M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-13 (1965).
debate is inconsequential. As Professor O'Connell of Oxford notes,
"the intention behind the use of the word 'sovereignty' . . . is to
concede to the coastal State plenary power to regulate events in the
territorial sea. ' 21 The Convention does not necessarily extend the
boundary of a State. It merely endorses any extension to the limits of
the' territorial sea.22 Because the coastal State could acquire
sovereignty at will, islands arising in its territorial sea would be
automatically subject to its sovereignty.
Continental Shelf
The Continental Shelf Convention states that "[t]he coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. '23 Of particular
importance is the use of the phrase "sovereign rights" instead of
sovereignty and the limitation of this power to exploration and ex-
ploitation of natural resources. Accounts of negotiations at the first
Law of the Sea Conference provide an explanation for this precise
wording. Many delegates feared that giving sovereignty over the
seabed and subsoil would provide the basis for further claims to the
superjacent sea and airspace.24
Confusion persists over "the judicial dilemma of whether it is
possible for sovereign rights to exist apart from sovereignty. ' 25 The
distinctions are, however, of little consequence. The coastal State
does not have sovereignty over its continental shelf, but it can exer-
cise the rights of sovereignty. These rights can be likened to an
exclusive license: No State may explore or exploit the continental
shelf of another State without its permission. Although the exact
legal nature of its claim remains unclear, the coastal State does have
exclusive jurisdiction over its continental shelf and thus over any
islands arising from it.
21. O'Connell, -The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea, [1971] 45 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 303, 357 (1973).
22. Id. at 357-58. Claim to islands arising in the territorial sea finds historical
support in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chellikani Rama Rao, 43
I.A. 192, 32 T.L.R. 652 (Ind. P.C. 1916). In this case the British Crown claimed an
island created by accretion off the coast of India, a colony at the time. Accord,
C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 129, at 120 (6th ed. 1967).
23. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
2(1), 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
24. B. BUZAN, SEABED PouTics 37-52 (1976).
25. Gutteridge, The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf,
[1959] 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 102, 114-15 (1960). See Clingan, Emerging Law of the
Sea: The Economic Zone Dilemma, 14 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 530 (1977).
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High Seas
High Seas are defined in the High Seas Convention as "all parts of
the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters of a State. ' 26 This definition encompasses only the sea itself,
not the seabed or subsoil.27 The Convention excludes the seabed and
subsoil because until recently, with few exceptions, they have not
been amenable to exploitation.2 8 The International Law Commission
(ILC) did not consider the issue of deep seabed exploitation suffi-
ciently important to be included in its High Seas Convention draft.29
Accordingly, the Convention does not mention the seabed's legal
status. A State could make no claim to the seabed through the High
Seas Convention.
The Area
The point at which the nascent islands may arise is approximately
150 miles from both the nearest United States and Japanese territory.
Because neither State claims a territorial sea of this width,30 only the
High Seas Convention is prima facie applicable. However, this
Convention provides no guidance in defining the status of an emerg-
ing island.
Of the four Geneva Conventions, the only potentially helpful alter-
native is the Continental Shelf Convention.3 This Convention gov-
26. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
27. But see C. COLOaIBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 81, at 67 (6th
ed. 1967). Colombos considers the regime of the high seas also to include the
seabed.
28. Historically exploitable have been the pearl beds off Ceylon, Venezuela
and the Persian Gulf, and sponge fishing grounds off Tunisia. B. BUZAN, SEABED
POLITICS 2 (1976).
29. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159, art. 27 commentary (2) (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COb 'N 253, 297, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.
A/1956/Add. 1.
30. The United States claims a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ.
Territorial Sea Limits, [1977-1978] STATESMAN'S Y.B., at xxiv (table). The Japa-
nese Cabinet recently ratified a law enforcing a 200-mile EEZ and increasing its
territorial sea from three to 12 miles. The law took effect July 1, 1977. N.Y.
Times, June 15, 1977, § 1, at 12, col. 3.
31. Although the United States is a party to all four Conventions, Japan has
signed only the Territorial Sea and the High Seas Conventions. TREATY AFFAIRS
STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE
(1976). However, should Japan wish to make a claim under the Continental Shelf
Convention, it could doubtless accede to it quickly.
erns the status of the seabed up to the lesser depth of 200 meters or to
the limit of seabed exploitability.32 Thus, the geography of the seabed
in each case determines whether the Convention applies. In the pre-
sent case the potential islands are more than 100 miles from any
shore, and the sea floor in the area is deep and irregular.
Potential islands would be outside the treaty's bounds. Any limita-
tion of the treaty's bounds would have to derive from the exploitabil-
ity criterion because there is water over 200 meters deep between the
volcanic area and the nearest land. If between the area over which
claim is made and the State's baseline the water is too deep to admit
of exploitation, the area will be beyond the State's jurisdiction. It is
impossible to say to what depths the seabed is exploitable, 33 but it is
likely that this depth is exceeded between either United States or
Japanese territory and the potential islands. Until the limits of ex-
ploitation reach a similar depth, the Continental Shelf Convention
will be an impotent theory for claiming these potential islands.
Contiguity
The second theory of prior claim is contiguity. This theory asserts
that sovereignty over the continental shelf accompanies sovereignty
over the continent because the shelf is an underwater extension of
the mainland.34 The basis of contiguity contrasts with that of the
Continental Shelf Convention because it is founded on the geograph-
32. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29,1958, art. 1,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
33. Deepsea Ventures has made a mining claim to the seabed beyond the
limits of State jurisdiction in a different part of the Pacific Ocean. However, any
estimate of the limits of exploitability would be mere speculation. Deepsea's
claim is in water 2,300 to 5,000 meters deep, and mining has yet to begin. See
Comment, An Illusion of Camelot, the Validity of a Claim, and the Conse-
quences of the Negotiations: The Great Nodule Spectacle, 13 SAN DiGo L. REv.
667 (1976).
34. This unity is "provided by the fact that the shelf is supposed to constitute
the base, the platform, on which the continent rests." Lauterpacht, Sovereignty
over Submarine Areas, [1950] 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 424 (1962). However,
contiguity does not always conform to the technical geographical definition of a
continental shelf.
It is possible to imagine... unity also in relation to submarine areas-
such as those in the Persian Gulf-which do not constitute a continental
shelf in the technical meaning of the term.... [T]he conception of the
continent resting on the shelf visualized as a platform may partake to
some degree of a figure of speech.
Id.
A similar theory is continuity. This denotes a geographical situation where the
claimed territory is not separated from the continent by water. Continuity and
contiguity are merely two applications of the same principle. Id. at 423; Von der
Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in Interna-
tional Law, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 448, 468 (1935).
[VOL. 15: 525, 1978] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ical unity of the continental shelf and its mainland rather than a legal
definition of the continental shelf.
A misapprehension of its fundamental premise has caused the
theory of contiguity to be met with mixed reactions.35 The doctrine
proceeds from the conception of a continent and its continental shelf
as being two parts of one whole, but critics of contiguity appear to
have forgotten this essential link between shelf and mainland. The
Arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Case exemplified misunderstand-
ing of the theory when he stated that "it is impossible to show the
existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that
islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a State
from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma (nearest
continent or island of considerable size). '36
Dr. Mouton of the Royal Netherlands Navy, not mentioning the
geological foundation of the theory, hypothesizes that claims to the
continental shelf purporting to be based on contiguity are in fact
"moved by reasons of security."3 To support this proposition he cites
The Anna, a case decided in 1805.38 In The Anna, an English Admir-
alty court considered whether some small islands were part of the
United States for purposes of determining jurisdiction over a ship.
The islands, formed by accretion, were located near the mouth of the
Mississippi River.39 Lord Stbwell held that they were part of the
United States and continued:
Consider what the consequence would be if lands of this description
were not considered as appendant to the mainland, and as comprised
within the bounds of territory. If they do not belong to the United
States of America, any other power might occupy them; they might be
embanked and fortified. What a thorn would this be in the side of
America!40
35. Y. BLUM, HISTORIc TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 176-77, 328-31 (1965); M.
LINDLEY, THE AcQUIsITIoN AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY 228-31
(1926). See generally Lauterpacht, Sovereignty overSubmarine Areas, [1950] 27
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 425-27 (1962) (discussion of contiguity's historical use).
36. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829, 854, 22 Aii. J. INT'L L. 867, 893 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (parenthetical
original). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 52 & 53
infra.
37. M. MOUTON, THE CoNTINENTAL SHELF 292 (1952).
38. The Anna, 165 Eng. Rep. 809 (Adm. 1805).
39. Lord Stowell's theory of accretion is unique. He states that an island
belongs to the State from which the alluvion came "even if it had been carried
over to an adjoining territory." Id. at 815.
40. Id.
The reason underlying the decision indeed appears to be the security
of the United States; but Dr. Mouton confuses this underlying moti-
vation with the legal theory used in conjunction with it-contiguity.
Professor Jennings of Cambridge argues that contiguity cannot
give an independent title but merely raises "some sort of presump-
tion of effective occupation."'41 Basing his argument on a power
theory, he hypothesizes that a State is more likely to have control
over a proximate than a distant res nullius. Although in this view
another theory of acquiring territory should accompany contiguity,
Professor Jennings concedes that contiguity could be a basis for
claim even in the absence of an accepted theory.42
Support for the theory of contiguity is evident after comparing the
ILC commentary to the Continental Shelf Convention 3 with the
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases.44 The commentary states:
Neither is it possible to disregard the geographical phenomenon what-
ever the term-propinquity, contiguity, geographical continuity, ap-
purtenance or identity-used to define the relationship between the
submarine areas in question and the adjacent non-submerged land.
All these considerations of general utility provide a sufficient basis for
the principle of the sovereign rights of the coastal State as now for-
mulated by the Commission.45
This comment could be interpreted to imply that contiguity has
always been an inchoate theory which, along with other "considera-
tions," is metamorphasized into Article 2 of the Continental Shelf
41. R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 74
(1963). See Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependen-
cies, [1948] 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311, 342 (1962).
42. R. JENNINGS, THE AcQuISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75
(1963).
43. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 253, U.N. Doc. AICN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
44. [1969] I.C.J. 3. In these cases Denmark and the Netherlands disputed with
Germany their respective shares of the North Sea continental shelf. Germany's
coastline on the North Sea bends at approximately a right angle. Application of
the equidistance rule in the Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Ge-
neva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311,
would have given Germany a smaller share than it claimed was equitable, The
court held that the equidistance rule is not mandatory and instructed the parties
to resume negotiations.
45. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 1, 43, U.N. Doc. A/3159, art. 68 commentary (8)
(1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'N 253, 298, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1. Article 68 of the ILC's draft treaty became Article 2,
paragraph 1 of the Convention, which states that "Ctihe coastal State exercises
o',er the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources." Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2 (1), 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,499 U.N.T.S. 311.
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Convention.46 The ICJ, however, has endorsed contiguity as a sepa-
rate theory. The court calls the doctrine "fundamental" and "inher-
ent," and states that it is "quite independent" of the Continental
Shelf Convention. 47 Lingering doubts were dispelled when the court
rejected Norway's erroneous conception of the theory, which was
based on proximity without mention of the underlying continental
shelf.48
Although it is accurate to say that contiguity is not as well received
as other theories, it remains a viable theory in international law. The
utility of the theory lies in its geographical rather than legal founda-
tion. It could be used to claim islands anywhere on a State's conti-
nental shelf, regardless of the 200-meter isobath or the depth of cur-
rent exploitability. Where two or more States share the same conti-
nental shelf, it may not be clear from which continental shelf an
island arose; but this uncertainty does not detract from the theory
itself.
Though contiguity is a valid theory of claim, the underwater geo-
graphy of the area between the Volcano and Mariana Islands pre-
cludes its use. Geographically, a continental shelf is a platform upon
which a continent rests, or it is an underwater extension of the
continent. Using this definition, the Volcano and Mariana Islands do
not sit atop continental shelves. They are merely the peaks of under-
water volcanoes. Arguably, a contiguity claim could be made to the
sides of these mountains, but this theory would not suffice to claim
the seabed over 100 miles away.
CLAIMs TowARD ACQUnUNG OWNERSHM
The theories included in the first class of claims were based on
prior claim to the seabed. In contrast, claims toward acquiring own-
ership assume that a newly emerged island would be a res nullius, or
owned by no one. Occupation and discovery are the theories compris-
ing this second class of claims.
Occupation
Occupation connotes the power of control over territory. It is an
elusive term, but its essence may be captured by comparing the
46. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29,1958, art. 2,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
47. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 23, para. 19.
48. Id. at 32-33, para. 44. See id. at 30-33, paras. 39-46.
holdings of three seminal cases: the Island of Palmas Case,49 the
Clipperton Island Case,50 and the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
Case.51
Island of Palmas concerned disputed sovereignty between the
United States and the Netherlands over Palmas Island. At issue was
whether the Netherlands had exercised peaceful and continuous
sovereignty (effective occupation) from the early eighteenth century
until 1898.52 Recognizing that displays of sovereignty were irregular
and few, the Arbitrator nonetheless found them sufficient. The tribu-
nal held that manifestations of sovereignty may vary with the nature
of the territory occupied. 53
King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy arbitrated Clipperton Island in
1931. The dispute concerned an uninhabited island in the Pacific
Ocean claimed by Mexico and France. In 1858 the French had landed
and symbolically annexed it. The issue was whether from that date
the island was effectively occupied even though it remained unin-
habited.54 The King stated that possession ordinarily requires the
establishment in the territory of "an organization capable of making
its laws respected. '55 Reasoning that this exercise of authority would
be pointless without inhabitants, he held that an uninhabited territo-
ry is effectively occupied "from the first moment when the occupying
state makes its appearance. 5 6 He added that at that time the occupa-
tion is "thereby completed." 57 The latter part of this holding has been
criticized. 58
In Eastern Greenland, Denmark and Norway litigated title over
unsettled areas of Greenland. The resolution of the case depended
upon the character of alleged Danish occupation. The Permanent
Court of International Justice noted that evidence of Danish occupa-
tion was scanty but was nonetheless sufficient because of the nature
of the territory. The court found necessary "very little in the way of
49. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
50. Clipperton Island Case (France v. Mexico), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1105,26
AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1931).
51. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No, 53.
52. Actually, it was only necessary that the Netherlands be found to have
effectively occupied the island in 1898, the critical date in the chain of title. 2 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards at 866-67, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. at 907-08.
53. Id. at 867, 22 A. J. INT'L L. at 908.
54. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1110, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 393.
55. Id., 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, (1950] 27 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 376, 417-18 (1962); Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falklands
Islands Dependencies, [1948] 25 BRaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 311, 324-25 (1962).
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the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State
could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in the
case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or un-
settled countries." 59
These cases show that the required degree of occupation is only
that necessary for "effectiveness." Effectiveness, in turn, refers to
that amount necessary "to guarantee a certain minimum of legal
order and legal protection within the boundaries, and to exclude any
interference from a third State."60 This amount of occupation varies
with the nature of the territory. In uninhabited or inaccessible ter-
ritories, a formal annexation may be sufficient. In more populated
areas, a military garrison and civil administration may be necessary.
Effective occupation of a newly emerged volcanic island after it
has cooled presents no difficulty, but occupation of submarine areas
poses unusual problems. Island of Palmas, however, held that
manifestations of sovereignty may vary with the nature of the terri-
tory occupied. 61 This principle may be applied to the seabed with
reference to evidence cited in Clipperton Island and Eastern Green-
land. In Clipperton Island, evidence deemed germane included the
account in the ship's log, an announcement in a newspaper, notifica-
tion to the French Government, and regulation of guano mining.62 In
Eastern Greenland, the court noted inter alia expeditions for hunt-
ing and scientific purposes,63 inspections, 64 and legislation governing
the area.65 These factors are evidence of occupation because they
illustrate the administration and control which is the essence of
sovereignty.
With the exception of guano mining regulation, these acts could
accompany any claim to the seabed. They could also accompany
claims to an erupting volcano, but this application does violence to
the natural meaning of the word "occupation." Clipperton Island
and Eastern Greenland show that a territory must be amenable to
human influence in the form of visits and regulation in order to be
occupied. These manifestations of occupation are proxies for human
59. [19333 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 171.
60. Von der Heydte, supra note 34, at 463.
61. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 867, 22 AM J. INT'L L. at 908.
62. 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1108, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 391-92.
63. [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 185.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 173, 184.
presence. If this line of reasoning is persuasive, it must be concluded
that uninhabitable territory cannot be occupied. It is difficult to
imagine less hospitable territory than an erupting volcano, whether
above or below the ocean surface.
Discovery
"Discovery" in the present context is defined as the encountering,
purposefully or accidentally, of previously unknown territory.66 The
encounter may be by visual apprehension or by disembarkation and
subsequent penetration or exploration. The definition does not in-
clude any acts evidencing intent to make claim to the territory. These
acts are called "symbolic annexation" and encompass the leaving of
plaques, construction of crosses, formal ceremonies, and the like.67
"Doctrine of discovery" is a general term and includes both discovery
and symbolic annexation.
The doctrine of discovery was born in the middle of the fifteenth
century when Europeans became aware of the rest of the world and
began their great voyages.68 The explorers wished to claim the terri-
tory they discovered for later exploitation. To this end, and in order
to avoid confusion, they created the doctrine. In the words of Justice
Story, "[ilt was probably adopted by the European nations as a
convenient and flexible rule, by which to regulate their respective
claims. '69
Considering the purpose of the doctrine, it is not surprising that at
no time was mere discovery "in any way sufficient per se to establish
a right of sovereignty over, or a valid title to, terra nullius." 0 The
most that could be claimed through discovery alone was an inchoate
and incomplete right. "Whenever statesmen deduced sovereign rights
from the bare fact of discovery, it was not because they were convinc-
ed of the correctness of their argumentation, but because they had no
better arguments to support their political claims." 71 The explorer,
however, could perfect his claim merely by performing a ceremony of
66. Cf. A. KELLER, 0. LISSITZYN, & F. MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS OF
SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMIBOLIc ACTS 1400-1800, at 4, 148 (1967) (other defini-
tions); Von der Heydte, supra note 34, at 452-57 (other definitions).
67. For a historical study of several States' discovery practices, see A. KEL-
LER, 0. LISSITZYN, & F. MANN, note 66 supra.
68. M. LINDLEY, THE AcQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
124-30 (1926); Von der Heydte, supra note 34, at 452-57.
69. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 2(2d ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1851) (1st ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1833).
70. A. KELLER, 0. LISSiTZYN, & F. MANN, supra note 66, at 148.
71. Von der Heydte, supra note 34, at 452.
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symbolic annexation after the discovery had occurred. This cere-
mony was sufficient to give his country legal title to the territory.
72
The doctrine of discovery resulted in numerous claims "based upon
trivial and isolated acts. '7 3 As explorers discovered more of the
world, it became obvious that further acts should be required for a
State to acquire sovereignty. This need produced the notion of effec-
tive occupation. No longer would it be sufficient for a State merely to
engage in formal ceremonies in order to annex terra nullius. The
State must also effectively occupy it.
74
The modem rule thus emerged: In order to perfect the inchoate
title conferred by discovery and symbolic annexation, a State must
effectively occupy the territory within a reasonable time.75 Discovery
survives, however, as a distinct though inferior theory of claim. As
Lauterpacht notes, ceteris paribus effective occupation gives a title
superior to that of discovery and symbolic annexation.7 6
Claims to a newly emerged island could be made through the
doctrine of discovery because it has historically been used to claim
newly found land. Aside from physical problems, there is no inherent
reason why the doctrine should not also apply to discovery underwa-
ter. Only in contemplation of circumstances peculiar to actually
erupting volcanic islands is the doctrine strained. Historically, cere-
monies of symbolic annexation have been almost invariably accom-
panied by a landing,77 but it would be impossible to land on an
erupting volcanic island as it emerged from the sea.
An exception to the rule of a requisite landing shows one solution
to the dilemma. In 1532 Captain Pedro de Guzman tried to land on a
72. The quality of the title thus acquired is uncertain. Keller, Lissitzyn and
Mann state that it is sovereignty. A. KELLER, 0. LISSITZYN, & F. MANN, supra
note 66, at 148-49. Von der Heydte characterizes it as a "possessory title." Von
der Heydte, supra note 34, at 453.
73. M. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY
139 (1926).
74. Occupation need not be by the same State that made the discovery.
Should a State acquire an inchoate title in territory and for one reason or
another decline to follow with effective occupation, other States are free to
occupy the territory. See Symmons, Legal Aspects of the Anglo-Irish Dispute
over Rockall, 26 N. IR. L.Q. 65 (1975).
75. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829 846,22 Am. J. INT'L L. 867, 883-84 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); M. LINDLEY,
THE AcQuIsrmoN AND GOVERNmENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY 136-37 (1926).
76. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty over Submarine Areas, [1950] 27 BRT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 376, 416 (1962).
77. A. KELLER, 0. LissiTzYN, & F. MANN, supra note 66, passim.
small island off the western coast of Mexico. Inclement weather and
the lack of a suitable harbor frustrated his attempts, and after three
days de Guzman ceased trying. Noting the hostile circumstances in
his log, he took possession from aboard ship. Instead of landing de
Guzman sailed completely around the island. He concluded that the
small size of the island and the impossibility of landing justified this
method of symbolic annexation. 8
De Guzman's situation shows that inaccessible territory may be
symbolically annexed without landing. This view is in accord with
Eastern Greenland, which holds that even inaccessible territory can
be occupied. 79 In the present situation perhaps an erupting volcanic
island could be annexed by encircling it with markers as it emerged.
One might, however, consider de Guzman's solution inconclusive and
Eastern Greenland distinguishable. An erupting volcanic island is
not only inaccessible but may also be unoccupiable. Because occupa-
tion is the sine qua non of a perfected discovery claim, only occupi-
able territory is subject to discovery. The notion of territorial occu-
pation fundamentally presumes identifiable, fixed, and relatively
solid ground to occupy. Flowing pools of lava distorted by irregular
explosions are alien to this presumption. 0
A State may claim a newly emerged island through both occupa-
tion and discovery, provided the island has sufficiently cooled to
admit human presence. The two doctrines also apply to the calm
seabed, subject to the state of technology and the physical environ-
ment, although they have rarely been used to claim underwater
territory.81 An emerging volcanic island, whether above or below
water, can be claimed through neither occupation nor discovery
because the continuing eruption would render it uninhabitable.
LEGAL CLAIMS IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT
A State could make a legal claim to a newly emerged island
through theories of international law, but political considerations
78. Id., at 35.
79. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, (1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at
175.
80. This presumption may initially appear to conflict with Lord Stowell's
dictum that "the right of dominion does not depend upon the texture of the soil."
The Anna, 165 Eng. Rep. 809, 815 (Adm. 1805). However, Lord Stowell was
considering the character of the soil for purposes of dominion, not occupation.
81. Exceptions include the pearl beds off Ceylon, Venezuela and the Persian
Gulf, and sponge fishing grounds off Tunisia. B. BuzAN, SEABED POLITICS 2
(1976).
Until recently, few have seriously considered underwater territorial acquisi-
tion. Today such an idea is increasingly credible. The UNCLOS HI deadlock
over seabed issues continues while States impatiently wait to exploit the sea.
See authorities cited note 8 supra.
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might render a claim ineffective. Theories of international law are
rules governing conduct among sovereign States, and sovereignty
denotes complete autonomy. Consequently, enforcement of these
rules can only be by consent or by coercion, but States generally fol-
low international law because it is expedient to do so.82 The interest
in an orderly international system usually outweighs the interest in
breaking the rules. Accordingly, in any potential dispute, the inter-
ests of the various parties must be identified and weighed in order to
determine whether States will comply with international law.
Interests of Japan and the United States
The interests of Japan in the area between the Volcano and Maria-
na Islands are great. The Japanese, who rely on seafood for a large
portion of their table fare, fish for bonito in this area. The news that
an island could be emerging sparked discussion among government
ministries and caused the Prime Minister's Office to create a special
council to coordinate information about the issue.83 If the United
States were to claim an island in this area, it could regulate Japanese
fishing in the 200-mile radius of its EEZ.
The interest of the United States is not so direct. The United States
also might be interested in fishing in the area, but more likely it
would be interested in mineral resources. It is possible that there are
manganese nodules on the area's sea floor. By one estimate the gross
value of all seabed nodules would be $150 trillion at current prices.8 4
One United States company, Deepsea Ventures, has already claimed
mining rights to nodules in another area of the Pacific Ocean.85 If the
sea between the Volcano and Mariana Islands is currently too deep
for mining, technology should soon render it accessible. Japan shares
in this interest with the United States.88
Interests of Underdeveloped States
Although the United States and Japan are the States which appar-
ently would attempt to claim an island arising in this area, underde-
82. Territorial acquisition is an area of international law in which the rules
have frequently been ignored. R. JENNINGS, THE AcQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1963).
83. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
84. Comment, An Illusion of Camelot, the Validity of a Claim, and the
Consequences of the Negotiations: The Great Nodule Spectacle, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 667, 668-70 (1976). However, this estimate "fails to take into account the
extent of the market for the metals at any price and the cost of extracting the
minerals from the sea." Id. at 669.
85. Id. at 671.
86. N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
veloped States would also have an interest in the claim. These States,
termed the "Group of 77, '' 87 would oppose any claim for two reasons.
First, unlike developed States, this Group does not have the capabili-
ty of exploiting the seabed. These States fear exclusion from what is
considered the common heritage of mankind.88 Second, should devel-
oped States begin mining seabed resources in quantity, the market
price of raw materials could plu~met. Consequently, both the price
level and the volume of underdeveloped States' exports would fall.
The ICNT reflects these fears. Part XI describes comprehensively
the Authority which would have jurisdiction over the seabed beyond
State jurisdictional limits. 89 This part is amply scored with provi-
sions for the protection of underdeveloped States. Article 136 sets the
tenor for Part XI by restating the common heritage concept, while
succeeding articles clearly show that underdeveloped States would
have an uncommonly large voice in distributing the wealth. Articles
144 and 150 are particularly noteworthy. They provide respectively
for technology transfer from developed to underdeveloped States and
for a detailed price-fixing mechanism to insure "just, stable and
remunerative prices for raw materials.
90
Underdeveloped States thus have an interest in keeping as much
seabed as possible within the jurisdiction of a future Authority.
Assuming no overlap of zones, each claim to a newly emerged island
by a State with a 200-mile EEZ would remove at least 125,000 square
miles of seabed from this jurisdiction.91 Although islands do not arise
frequently, the phenomenon is not unknown. In this century at least
87. B. BuzAN, SEABED PoLITics 54 (1976).
88. For several years States have agreed in principle that the sea is the
common heritage of mankind. This principle found its first generally accepted
articulation in a United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1970, G.A. Res.
2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). It also has
been reflected in the various negotiating texts produced in UNCLOS III. Infor-
mal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/W?. 10 (1977); Revised
Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. AConf. 62/WP.8/Rev. 1 (1976); Informal Sin-
gle Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. AConf. 62/WP.8 (1975). However, neither the
texts nor the resolution constitute law. The texts merely represent the current
state of thinking on the law of the sea. Resolutions are not legally binding but
are considered evidence of what the law is. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-51
(3d ed. 1971); Gross, The Development of International Law Through the
United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS 171, 198-203 (J. Barros ed. 1972). But cf.
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International
Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965) (unanimous resolutions as in-
stant customary international law without the necessity of practice over a
period of time). See also note 12 supra. These documents may have a certain
moral force, but the 1958 Geneva Conventions remain the law of the sea.
89. U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/WP. 10, arts. 133-92 (1977).
90. Id., art. 150(1)(d).
91. Should the EEZ overlap any other zones, the area removed from an
Authority's jurisdiction would be smaller.
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three have arisen, the most recent being Surtsey, off Iceland, in
1965.92 At any point where active underwater volcanoes exist an
island could emerge.
The interest of underdeveloped States in a claim near the Marianas
would not be limited to islands which may arise in this area. The
resolution of a claim could affect the legal status of existing islets
and rocks.93 States have considered these worthless in the past be-
cause they are small and barren. 4 Some remain terra nullius, and
some have been claimed, but no State has claimed a continental shelf
or EEZ for an islet or rock.
The Territorial Sea Convention defines an island simply as "a
naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high-tide." 95 However, the drafters of the Informal Single
Negotiating Text (a predecessor to the ICNT issued in 1975) added a
provision to the Territorial Sea Convention's definition of an island.
The provision states that an island must be able to sustain human
habitation or economic life of its own." This addition appears to be
unchallenged because it has been carried over in the Revised Single
Negotiating Text (the immediate predecessor to the ICNT)97 and in
the ICNT as well.98 The meaning of the provision is ambiguous but
could be clarified should a volcanic island be claimed. Depending
upon the condition of a volcanic island at the time of claim, a claim
could create a precedent that would allow islets and rocks to gener-
ate continental shelves and EEZs. Many more square miles of the
seabed than before thus would be outside the jurisdiction of a seabed
Authority. Ultimately, underdeveloped States could have a greater
92. Thorarinsson, Surtsey: Island Born of Fire, 127 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 713
(1965). See note 5 supra.
93. The sea surrounds a number of islets and rocks. These are defined in the
present context as protuberances of land above water. Distinctions among is-
lands, islets and rocks based on size have been proposed, but there is no
commonly accepted standard. See Hodgson & Smith, The Informal Single
Negotiating Text (Committee I): A Geographical Perspective, 3 OcEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 225, 230-32 (1976).
94. But see Symmons, Legal Aspects of the Anglo-Irish Dispute over Rock-
all, 26 N. IR. L.Q. 65 (1975). In 1955 the British Crown formally annexed Rockall,
a rock located between Scotland and Ireland. The rock is important because of
potential mineral resources and existing fishing in the surrounding area.
95. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 10(1), 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205.
96. U.N. Doc. Aidonf. 62/WP. 8, art. 132(3) (1975).
97. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1/pt. II, art. 128(3) (1976).
98. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, art. 121(3) (1977).
interest in the outcome of a claim to a new island than either the
United States or Japan.
A Balancing of Interests
The United States and Japan have a great interest in claiming a
newly emerged island between the Volcano and Mariana Islands.
Underdeveloped States have a comparably great interest in prevent-
ing a claim. Because international law would coincide with the inter-
ests of the United States and Japan, it remains to be determined
whether underdeveloped States could exert extra-legal pressures
sufficient to circumvent a claim.
Politically, underdeveloped States could condemn the United
States or Japan, but this action would have little deterrent effect. The
United States, if not Japan, has grown accustomed to vilification in
the United Nations General Assembly. Further threats would be
meaningless. Similarly, the Group of 77 could exert little pressure in
UNCLOS Ill. The deadlocked conference falters over deep seabed
issues while technology swiftly progresses..
Economically, underdeveloped States could exert substantial pres-
sure if they were to act in unison. Perfection of seabed mining tech-
niques lies several years in the future, and the United States and
Japan are dependent upon a number of underdeveloped States for
the minerals they hope to mine. The 1973 oil embargo starkly high-
lighted the power of a raw materials boycott. However, a similar
boycott by the Group of 77 would probably not succeed. The Group
would doubtless find it difficult to persuade its members which
export minerals to the United States and Japan to bear the economic
consequences of an embargo. Furthermore, the sheer size of the
Group gives rise to internal divisions which would defeat consensus
on an embargo. Because a boycott is unlikely, economic pressure
from underdeveloped States would be virtually nil.
On balance, a claim by either the United States or Japan would
succeed as against each other and as against the underdeveloped
world. Such a claim would be legal under international law. The
extra-legal sanctions the underdeveloped world could exert would be
minute in comparison with the interests of the United States or of
Japan in claiming a newly emerged island near the Marianas.
CONCLUSION
Of the four theories considered in this Comment, States could use
only occupation and discovery to claim a newly emerged island be-
tween the Volcano and Mariana Islands. The undersea geography of
the area and the distance from other land at which an island would
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probably emerge preclude use of the 1958 Geneva Conventions and
contiguity.
Although a claim to a newly emerged island would be legal,
whether it would be pressed depends upon the reactions of other
States. A State would probably be persuaded to forego a claim for the
benefit of international harmony if UNCLOS EEI negotiations were
progressing with facility. However, UNCLOS III is stagnating over
seabed issues. Meanwhile, technology progresses rapidly, bringing
the time the deep seabed is readily exploitable ever closer. The inter-
ests of developed States are such that in the absence of an interna-
tional convention governing the seabed, one would expect them to
make individual claims.
The emergence of an island could be salutary to UNCLOS HI
negotiations. The actions of the United States, Japan and other
States would demonstrate the extent of interest in the seabed. Events
could inject a needed element of urgency into UNCLOS III, hastening
a seabed agreement. The birth of an island would show that without
a treaty, the common heritage concept will die, and chaos will infect
the exploitation of the sea.
Jnuiy L. VERNER, JR.

